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ABSTRACT
The idea that episodic memory is a form of mental time travel has played an important role 
in the development of memory research in the last couple of decades. Despite its growing 
importance in psychology, philosophers have only begun to develop an interest in philo-
sophical questions pertaining to the relationship between memory and mental time travel. 
Thus, this paper proposes a more systematic discussion of the relationship between memo-
ry and mental time travel from the point of view of philosophy. I start by discussing some of 
the motivations to take memory to be a form of mental time travel. I call the resulting view 
of memory the mental time travel view. I then proceed to consider important philosophical 
questions pertaining to memory and develop them in the context of the mental time travel 
view. I conclude by suggesting that the intersection of the philosophy of memory and re-
search on mental time travel not only provides new perspectives to think about traditional 
philosophical questions, but also new questions that have not been explored before.
Keywords: mental time travel, memory, episodic memory, philosophy of memory.
RESUMO
A ideia de que a memória episódica é uma forma de viagem no tempo mental (“mental 
time travel”) desempenhou um papel importante no desenvolvimento da pesquisa sobre 
memória nas últimas duas décadas. Apesar de sua crescente importância na psicologia, 
apenas recentemente os filósofos começaram a interessar-se por questões filosóficas rela-
tivas à relação entre memória e viagem no tempo mental. Assim, este artigo propõe uma 
discussão mais sistemática da relação entre memória e viagem no tempo mental do ponto 
de vista da filosofia. Começo discutindo algumas das motivações para considerar a me-
mória uma forma de viagem no tempo mental. Chamo a visão resultante sobre a memória 
de visão “mental time travel”. Procuro então considerar importantes questões filosóficas 
relativas à memória e desenvolvê-las no contexto da visão “mental time travel”. Concluo 
sugerindo que a intersecção entre a filosofia da memória e a pesquisa sobre viagem no 
tempo mental não apenas fornece novas perspectivas para pensar sobre questões filosó-
ficas tradicionais, mas também novas questões que não foram exploradas anteriormente.
Palavras-chave: viagem no tempo mental, memória, memória episódica, filosofia da memória.
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Introduction 
The idea that episodic memory is a form of mental 
time travel has played an important role in the develop-
ment of memory research in the last couple of decades. 
Mental time travel, according to Suddendorf and Corbal-
lis (1997, p. 133), “comprises the mental reconstruction of 
personal events from the past (episodic memory) and the 
mental construction of possible events in the future”. “The 
real importance of mental time travel”, they add, “applies to 
travel into the future rather than into the past; that is, we 
predominantly stand in the present facing the future rath-
er than looking back at the past” (Suddendorf and Corbal-
lis, 1997, p. 147). 
Traditionally, memory has been taken to be primarily 
about the past, in the sense that it allows us to recall things 
that happened. However, the suggestion that episodic 
memory is just a form of mental time travel challenges this 
idea, for “the primary role of mental time travel into the 
past is to provide raw material from which to construct 
and imagine possible futures” (Suddendorf and Corballis, 
2007, p. 302). These considerations raise a number of im-
portant philosophical questions. A first relevant question 
refers to whether memory requires an appropriate causal 
connection to past experiences or events. Since Martin and 
Deutscher (1966), it has been standard to assume that re-
membering requires such a connection (see, e.g., Berneck-
er, 2008; Debus, 2008; Michaelian, 2011; Robins, 2016b). 
A second relevant question is whether episodic memory 
can be a source of knowledge of the past (see Debus, 2014; 
Michaelian, 2016b). Since mental time travel into the past, 
or episodic memory, is in the service of providing raw ma-
terial to simulate future scenarios, it is not clear whether 
or under what conditions it can provide us with reliable 
information about past happenings. A third and more gen-
eral question refers to the relationship between memory 
and other forms of mental time travel, such as imagining 
future events. Because both are a result of similar cogni-
tive capacities, the question of whether they belong to the 
same metaphysical kind becomes central (see Perrin and 
Michaelian, 2017).
These and other questions have attra ed attention 
from philosophers concerned with memory (see, e.g., De Bri-
gard, 2014; Debus, 2014; Michaelian, 2016b; Perrin, 2016). 
In this paper, I will explore some of the implications that the 
mental time travel view of memory, as I will refer to it, has for 
the philosophy of memory. I will start by discussing some mo-
tivations to consider episodic memory as a form of mental 
time travel. Subsequently, I will explore the implications of 
this idea for the philosophy of memory. 
Episodic memory and 
mental time travel 
Before we discuss the relationship between episod-
ic memory and mental time travel, it will be helpful to first 
clarify what episodic memory is. The term was initially intro-
duced by Endel Tulving (1972, p. 385) and, roughly  eaking, 
corresponds to the memory system responsible for receiving 
and storing “information about temporally dated episodes or 
events, and temporal-spatial relations among these events”.2 
So, when you episodically remember an event, your memo-
ry contains information about the what, the where, and the 
when associated with that event. That is the so-called what-
when-where view of episodic memory, or simply the www 
view. Episodic memories, in Tulving’s initial formulation, 
contrast with semantic memories, which refer to memories 
about general facts that were not necessarily experienced. 
For example, when I remember that the Second World War 
ended in 1945, I am semantically remembering a fact by using 
language. The semantic memory system, Tulving says, refers 
to the “organized knowledge a person possesses about words 
and other verbal symbols, their meanings and referents, about 
relations among them, about rules, formulas, and algorithms 
for the manipulation of these symbols, concepts, and rela-
tions” (1972, p. 386). Thus, in contrast to episodic memories, 
semantic memories do not require the previous experience of 
the relevant events. 
The important thing to note about this definition of ep-
isodic memory is that it is primarily based on the kind of in-
formation that is processed and stored. And, because of this, 
it faces some important problems. One such problem refers 
to the fact that some semantic memories possess the relevant 
“www” information; for example, my memory that the Wa-
terloo battle was fought in 1815. Thus, it is not entirely clear 
whether episodic memories and semantic memories can be 
distinguished solely on the basis of the information possessed 
by them. Another problem refers to the phenomenological 
dimension of episodic memories. Remembering a particular 
event that was previously experienced seems to involve more 
than the retrieval of information. Episodically remembering 
seems to have a distinctive phenomenology, involving a “feeling 
of pastness” (Russell, 1921, p. 161-162) and a “feeling of warmth 
and intimacy” (James, 1890). In other words, besides the in-
formation carried, episodic memories seem to make reference 
to the past (“feeling of pastness”) and to belong to subjects in a 
unique way (“feeling of warmth and intimacy”). For example, 
when I remember my tenth birthday party, the memory not 
only presents the event as having occurred in the past, but also 
as being “mine”, in the sense that I seem to own the memory. 
2 The term memory is ambiguous and might refer to different things, such as one’s capacity to remember (e.g., “John has a good memo-
ry”), the cognitive system responsible for producing memories (e.g., “Your memory is not working well”), or the outputs of that cognitive 
system, namely the mental states that we call “memories” (e.g., “I have a memory of my tenth birthday party”). For my purposes, I use 
the term to refer both to the cognitive system responsible for producing memories and to the individual mental states produced by it.
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These and other difficulties led Tulving to reformulate 
his first chara erization of episodic memory. Later on, he 
proposed a definition that took into account the phenome-
nological a ects described above. According to him, besides 
carrying “www” information, episodic memories involve 
a unique kind of consciousness, which he called autonoetic 
consciousness or simply autonoesis (see Tulving, 1985, 2005). 
Autonoesis, Tulving says, “refers to the kind of conscious 
awareness that chara erizes conscious recollection of per-
sonal happenings”; that is, it is what makes subjects “aware 
that the present experience is related to the past experience 
in a way that no other kind of experience is” (2005, p. 15).3
The definition of episodic memory as involving auton-
oesis is very important. Because “[t]he act of remembering 
[...] is chara erized by a distinctive, unique awareness of re-
experiencing here and now something that happened before, 
at another time and in another place” (Tulving, 1993, p. 68), 
remembering makes subjects “capable of mental time travel: 
[...] [a] person can transport at will into the personal past, as 
well as into the future” (p. 67, my emphasis). So, besides be-
ing responsible for the unique feeling associated with episodic 
memories, autonoesis gives subjects a more general capacity 
to “travel” in subjective time. This is not difficult to motivate 
on phenomenological grounds. As Klein (2015, p. 21) notes, 
there is a “perceived temporal symmetry between move-
ments toward (future) and away (past) from the present”. To 
illustrate, imagine that you are thinking about your holidays 
at the beach next year. Similarly to episodic memories, you 
have the feeling that the thought is owned by you, in the sense 
that the holidays are yours and not someone else’s. However, 
because the event is something that can happen, it is present-
ed to you as being “future” to your current thought. Thus, it 
looks like we can “relocate” ourselves to the future in the same 
way that we can do it in relation to the past. 
The capacity endowed to us by autonoesis to travel both 
to past subjective time and to future subjective time consists 
in an important motivation to take episodic memory to be 
just one form – among others – of mental time travel. Despite 
giving emphasis to phenomenological considerations above, 
there are also good empirical reasons to endorse this view. 
In a recent survey, Perrin and Michaelian (2017) discuss sim-
ilarities between episodic memory and future mental time 
travel found in different domains. In developmental studies, 
for example, it has been shown that the children’s capacity to 
remember the past and imagine the future arise at approxi-
mately the same time (Suddendorf and Busby, 2005; Atance, 
2008; Fivush, 2011). In studies with patients with memory 
impairments, it has been found that deficits in memory in-
cur in similar deficits in the ability to think about future sce-
narios (Klein et al., 2002; Rosenbaum et al., 2005; Hassabis et 
al., 2007). Moreover, imaging studies also show that there is 
a strong overlap in the brain regions associated with episod-
ic memory and future mental time travel (Addis et al., 2007; 
Scha er et al., 2007, 2012). 
I will not attempt to review the relevant literature here.4 
I shall, instead, point out an important development of the 
mental time travel view of memory. More recently, some re-
searchers have sugge ed that the primary function of mental 
time travel is not to allow us to remember the past. Sudden-
dorf and Corballis, for example, argue that “[t]he real impor-
tance of mental time travel applies to travel into the future 
rather than into the past; that is, we predominantly stand in 
the present facing the future rather than looking back at the 
past” (1997, p. 147). In a similar spirit, De Brigard says that 
“remembering is a particular operation of a cognitive system 
that permits the flexible recombination of different compo-
nents of encoded traces into representations of possible past 
events [...] in the service of constructing mental simulations 
of possible future events” (2014, p. 158, my emphasis). And, 
more recently, Michaelian says that “remembering is not 
different in kind from other episodic constructive processes” 
(2016b, p. 103); thus, “[w]hat it is for a subject to remember 
[...] is for him to imagine an episode belonging to his personal 
past” (2016b, p. 111). 
The idea that the primary function of mental time trav-
el is not to remember the past but to imagine the future has 
important consequences. One such consequence is that our 
common sense conception of memory, according to which 
memory’s function is to store information of what happened, 
seems to be threatened. It is compatible with the mental time 
travel view that our representations of the past be inaccurate 
as long as they are beneficial for future a ions. So, as De Bri-
gard notes, “many ordinary cases of misremembering should 
not be seen as instances of memory’s malfunction” (2014, 
p. 158, his emphasis). This raises a further question, which 
is of particular interest to philosophers, about whether, and 
if so, how, memory provides knowledge of the past. Because 
the primary function of remembering is not to recover in-
formation about the past, we need a proper account of how 
knowledge can be formed on the basis of memory. Similarly, 
the mental time travel view poses important questions per-
taining to the relationship between memories and the past 
events. The causal theory of memory, which has been pre-
dominant in philosophy for the past four decades, stipulates 
3 Although initially characterized in phenomenological terms, there is no agreement as to what autonoesis is exactly. Some have argued, 
for instance, that autonoesis has an important epistemic value. For example, Dokic (2001, 2014) holds that episodic memory carries a 
“feeling of knowing”, in the sense that it tells subjects that it originates in their past experiences. Fernández (2016) defends a similar 
view, but he builds autonoesis into the content of memory rather than in its phenomenology. Quite recently, Mahr and Csibra (2018) 
have proposed a “communicative” account of the function of episodic memory, in which autonoesis is viewed as being responsible for 
“[delineating] which of our claims about the past we can assert epistemic authority”. Despite these important developments, I shall take 
for granted the more standard idea that autonoesis is mainly a phenomenological feature of episodic memory.
4 For a detailed review concerned with philosophical questions, see Perrin and Michaelian (2017).
Mental time travel and the philosophy of memory 
55Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 19(1):52-62, jan/apr 2018
that remembering requires the preservation of an appropri-
ate causal connection to past events. However, if memory is a 
form of mental time travel in the same way that imagination 
is, and “if imagining need not draw on stored information 
ultimately originating in experience of the relevant episode” 
(Michaelian, 2016b, p. 111), there is no principled reason to 
say that such requirement holds for memory. 
In summary, the mental time travel view of memory 
raises a lot of important questions for philosophers concerned 
with memory. In an attempt to motivate those problems, I will 
consider, in the next section, some implications that the mental 
time travel view of memory has for the philosophy of memory.
Mental time travel and the 
philosophy of memory 
The mental time travel view of memory not only chal-
lenges important traditional conceptions about memory, but 
also offers pro ects for future research on the subject. In this 
section, I will consider some topics that are of potential interest 
to philosophers of memory concerning the mental time travel 
view of memory. However, because the interest of philosophers 
on those topics is still very recent, there are not many works 
dealing systematically with the questions that I discuss below. 
For this reason, rather than attempting to survey the debate, I 
will try to motivate some problems of potential interest. 
The causal theory of memory 
After the publication of Martin and Deutscher’s sem-
inal paper “Remembering” (1966), philosophers in the an-
alytic tradition started to develop an increasing interest in 
philosophical questions pertaining to memory. Martin and 
Deutscher proposed what is now known as the causal theory 
of memory (CTM). The CTM has been very influential and it 
still shapes, to a large extent, the way how philosophers think 
about memory today.5 However, if correct, the mental time 
travel view raises important concerns about the CTM. 
The CTM provides us with a set of criteria to deter-
mine whether a given mental state counts as remembering 
or not. For the CTM, a subject S counts as remembering an 
event e iff:
(1)  S represented e in the past (Pa  representation con-
dition);
(2)  S has a current mental representation of e (Current 
representation condition);
(3)  The content of the current mental representation 
of e is sufficiently similar to the content of the past 
representation of e (Content condition);
(4)  There is an appropriate causal connection between 
the current representation of e and the past repre-
sentation of e (Causal connection condition).6 
To clarify these points, consider my putative memory 
of my tenth birthday party. In order for me to count as re-
membering this event, I need to have experienced it previ-
ously. That is the pa  representation condition. Additionally, 
I need to be able to represent the same event in the pres-
ent. That is the current representation condition. But my past 
and current representations can only be representations of 
the same event if their contents are sufficiently similar (the 
content condition); for example, if the contents of both rep-
resentations contain members of my family and friends, a 
chocolate cake, etc.7 Finally, remembering requires that my 
current representation of my tenth birthday be caused, in 
an appropriate way, by my past representation of the same 
event (the causal connection condition). The requirement for 
such causal connection consists in the main novelty of the 
CTM. Moreover, since it is also the source of the problems 
that arise in the context of the mental time travel view of 
memory, I will focus on it more closely. 
The causal condition is supposed to rule out cases that, 
intuitively, we do not count as remembering, but that are al-
lowed by (1)–(3). To see this, consider the case of Kent de-
scribed by Martin and Deutscher (1966, p. 174): 
A man whom we shall call Kent is in a car 
accident and sees particular details of it, be-
cause of his special position. Later on, Kent 
is involved in another accident in which he 
gets a severe blow on the head as a result of 
which he forgets a certain section of his own 
history, including the first accident. He can 
no longer fulfil the first criterion for memo-
ry of the first accident. Some time after this 
second accident, a popular and rather irre-
sponsible hypnotist gives a show. He hyp-
5 For a recent and comprehensive assessment of the CTM in relation to recent developments in the philosophy of memory, see Michae-
lian and Robins (2018).
6 This discussion is adapted from Bernecker (2010, ch. 1). See also Bernecker (2015, p. 302). 
7 Martin and Deutscher conceive of this similarity in terms of a structural analogy holding between the past representation and the cur-
rent representation. They say that “the past experience must constitute a structural analogue of the thing remembered, to the extent to 
which [the person] can accurately represent the thing” (1966, p. 191, my emphasis). It is not entirely clear, however, where the structural 
analogy is to be found. The most natural interpretation seems to be that the content of the past representation must have the same 
kind of structure as the content of the current representation, but they do not say anything as to what the structure of those contents 
is supposed to be. Another issue is that it is not clear how much “structural analogy” is required for S to count as remembering. While 
we do not want to require the content of the past representation to be the same as the content of the current representation, it is hard 
to find a principled way to determine how much similarity is required. For my purposes, I shall put these worries aside. For a related 
discussion, see Michaelian (2011, 2016b, p. 90).
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notizes a large number of people and sug-
gests to them that they will believe that they 
had been in a car accident at a certain time 
and place. The hypnotist has never heard a 
thing about Kent nor the details of Kent’s 
accident, and it is by sheer coincidence 
that the time, place, and details which he 
provides are just as they were in Kent’s first 
accident. Kent is one of the group which is 
hypnotized. The suggestion works and [...] 
[Kent] believes firmly that he has been in an 
accident. The accident as he believes it to 
be is just like the first one in which he was 
really involved. 
Kent’s case satisfies (1) and (2), as he had a past repre-
sentation of the car accident and has a current representation 
of the same event. Moreover, it satisfies (3) too, for Kent’s 
current representation is sufficiently similar to his past rep-
resentation. Nevertheless, it seems wrong to say that Kent is 
genuinely remembering. The reason is that his current repre-
sentation does not preserve the right kind of causal connec-
tion to his past representation. To use Martin and Deutscher’s 
(1966) term, the past representation is not “operative” in pro-
ducing the current representation. In Kent’s case, the opera-
tive cause, so to  eak, is the hypnotist. For the CTM, then, 
remembering is not only a matter of getting the details of a 
past experience of an event right, but also of standing in an 
appropriate causal relation to that experience. 
Besides offering a way to rule out cases not contem-
plated by (1)–(3), the causal connection condition has also 
been used to provide a taxonomy of memory. As it stands, 
the CTM is an answer to the general question of what it takes 
for a subject to remember. However, there is more than one 
way in which one can successfully or unsuccessfully remem-
ber something, which requires an account of those differenc-
es. For example, it is consistent with remembering my tenth 
birthday party that I get some of its details wrong.8 I can cor-
rectly remember that my whole family was there and that the 
party took place at a certain location, but I can simultaneous-
ly remember, incorrectly, that I had strawberry cake. In this 
case, we can say that I am misremembering my tenth birthday 
party. Thus, Robins (2016b) has recently argued that, given 
the constructive chara er of memory (see Bartlett, 1995; 
Scha er et al., 2007, 2012; Michaelian, 2011; De Brigard, 
2014), we need to appeal to a causal connection between 
past and current representations to distinguish remember-
ing from misremembering.9 In a similar spirit, Bernecker 
(2017) has sugge ed that one can only distinguish successful 
remembering from confabulations (see Hirstein, 2005) if one 
requires that the former, but not the latter, preserves a causal 
connection to past experiences (see also Robins 2016b, 2017). 
The causal connection, therefore, is not only important to 
provide an adequate analysis of remembering, but also of the 
different kinds of successful and unsuccessful remembering. 
The mental time travel view of memory challenges 
the central status given to the causal connection condition 
in a theory of memory. As I discussed above, in the mental 
time travel view, the primary function of memory is not to 
remember the past (see Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997; De 
Brigard, 2014; Michaelian, 2016b). But, if that is the case, 
then it is hard to see why we should endorse the CTM. There 
are multiple reasons to think so. One reason is that, as Mi-
chaelian (2016b, p. 111) notes, because other forms of mental 
time travel need not have such a causal connection to past 
experiences, there is no principled way to require it in the case 
of memory. This does not mean, of course, that there cannot 
be such a connection, but only that it is not necessary. 
Another reason is that, from the per ective of the 
mental time travel view, straightforward occurrences of 
remembering would be ruled out by the CTM. The causal 
connection allows us to preserve the intuition that, in cases 
such as Kent’s, subjects do not count as remembering. How-
ever, intuitively we do not seem to require that all occur-
rences of remembering preserve an appropriate causal con-
nection to past events. Consider the following case. Imagine 
that I experienced my tenth birthday party in the past and 
that I now have a putative memory of it. I remember my 
friends and family being there and I remember having choc-
olate cake. However, suppose that my current representa-
tion is not being caused by my previous representation of 
my tenth birthday party, but rather by two different expe-
riences that involved the relevant elements of my current 
representation. In this case, the content of my current rep-
resentation is partly derived from, say, my experience of my 
ninth birthday party, which was attended by the same indi-
viduals, and partly derived from my experience of another 
party that I attended, where there was a chocolate cake. In 
this case, there is no causal connection of the sort required 
by the CTM, but it seems too stringent to say that the sub-
ject is not remembering the relevant event only because the 
content of his current representation is not derived from 
the content of the original experience.10
A third reason why the mental time travel view chal-
lenges the CTM is that the latter is incompatible with the 
8 Although, again, how much inaccuracy is consistent with remembering is not entirely clear. See Michaelian (2011) and note 7.
9 See Michaelian (2016a) for a critique of Robins’s proposal and an attempt to provide a taxonomy of memory that abandons the causal 
connection altogether.
10 One might argue here that, intuitively, the case above does not count as a straightforward occurrence of remembering rightly because 
there is no causal connection. I do not mean to dispute people’s intuitions about this and other similar cases, but, as long as we want 
our intuitions to be compatible with what empirical research tells us about memory, this seems the most plausible way to describe them. 
In other words, given the constructive character of memory (see, e.g., Bartlett, 1995; Schacter et al., 2007, 2012; Michaelian, 2011; De 
Brigard, 2014), it is not unlikely that cases as the one described above can happen. 
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constructive chara er of mental time travel. Because men-
tal time travel is in the service of simulating events to as-
sist subjects in future intera ions with the environment, 
it seems too restrictive to require that our representations 
of the past have to draw content from only one singular 
source. For example, in thinking about how I should act in 
my job interview next week, my current representation of 
the past will benefit more from drawing on different past 
experiences of job interviews than drawing on only one sin-
gular experience.11 
In sum, the CTM has occupied a central position in 
philosophical theorizing about memory for the past fifty 
years. Besides providing an analysis of remembering that ac-
counts for a wide range of cases, it provides a useful principle 
to conceive of a taxonomy of remembering. However, if the 
mental time travel view of memory is right, the centrality of 
the CTM might not be warranted. 
Mental time travel and 
our knowledge of the past 
One direct consequence of abandoning the causal condi-
tion can be seen in the epistemology of memory. Because the 
causal condition is no longer necessary to remember, there is 
no guarantee that the content of our current representations 
derives from the content of our past representations. That be-
ing the case, the question that poses itself is whether, and if so, 
how, we can form knowledge of what happened in the past on 
the basis of our current representations. Is mental time travel 
capable of providing such knowledge? Before I turn to this 
question, it is important to distinguish between two senses in 
which it can be asked. On the one hand, we can ask the prag-
matic question of whether memory provides us with infor-
mation that, in pra ical contexts, allows for useful inferences 
about how things were in the past. Call this the pragmatic epis-
temic question. On the other hand, we can ask whether mem-
ory actually provides knowledge of the past, in the sense that 
it serves as grounds for our justified beliefs about it. Call this 
the strict epistemic question. 
This distinction is important because a positive answer 
to the pragmatic epistemic question does not necessarily give 
us a positive answer to the strict epistemic question. It might 
be the case that the content of my memory of my tenth birth-
day party is the same or very similar to the content of the 
memories that other people have of this event, such that I can 
make useful inferences about the event in relevant contexts, 
but it does not follow from this that my memory allows me to 
know anything about this event. An answer to the strict epis-
temic question, in contrast, requires identifying what makes 
it possible that our current memories serve as grounds for our 
justified beliefs about the past. 
The causal condition provides an answer to the strict 
epistemic question. Because the content of my current repre-
sentation of an event is caused by my past representation of it, 
the causal connection makes it possible for memory to ground 
my knowledge of the past. Otherwise put, the beliefs that we 
form on the basis of memory are justified because there is an 
appropriate causal connection between memories and past 
events. However, if, as the mental time travel view suggests, 
this condition is not necessary for remembering, how can we 
explain the relationship between the content of our past and 
current representations? 
It is not entirely clear what the alternatives for defend-
ers of the mental time travel view are here. In fact, because 
he is the most systematic critic of the causal condition, Mi-
chaelian (2016b) has been the only one so far to provide an 
explicit treatment of the question. His approach consists 
in adopting a broad reliabilist framework in epistemology, 
according to which “the epistemic status of a belief is de-
termined by the reliability of the process that produced it” 
(Michaelian, 2016b, p. 39; see also Goldman, 2012). Rough-
ly, the idea is that one is justified in holding a certain belief if 
that belief was produced by a reliable process. On Michae-
lian’s proposal, then, we can explain why memory serves as 
grounds for forming knowledge of the past in terms of the 
reliability of its underlying processes. This solution, how-
ever, will not be appealing if one is not already inclined 
to a form of reliabilism. The reason is that, as Michaelian 
(2016b, p. 40) recognizes, it takes reliabilism as a starting 
point and then proceeds to explain how memory is reliable. 
However, if one is skeptical of the idea that reliability itself 
can provide an account of epistemic justification, an ac-
count of how memory is reliable will not suffice to address 
the strict epistemic question. 
The question of whether reliabilism is a good account 
of epistemic justification is beyond my scope here. Howev-
er, given the question at hand about how memory can form 
knowledge about the past, it might be useful to explore oth-
er alternatives. One possible approach might be to adopt an 
eternalist view of events (e.g., Bernecker, 2008). According 
to eternalism, past events do not cease to exist when they 
become past. Eternalism is promising because it allows one 
to say that past events are constitutive parts of memories. 
To see this, consider an analogy with perception. Relational-
ists about perception claim that mid-sized objects are consti-
tutive parts of perception, in the sense that I could not have a 
visual experience of the chair in my office if this object were 
not there (see, e.g., Campbell, 2002; Martin, 2004; Brewer, 
2007; Fish, 2009). An important motivation for acknowl-
edging the constitutive role played by objects in perception is 
that it allows one to explain how they ground our knowledge 
of the world (see Schellenberg, 2016, for a recent discussion). 
Similarly, it might be argued, acknowledging the constitutive 
11 See, however, Sutton (1998) and Michaelian (2011) for different attempts to provide a causal view compatible with the constructive 
character of memory. For a related discussion, see Robins (2016a, 2016b).
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role played by past events in memories allows one to explain 
how they ground our knowledge of the past.12
Eternalism faces important problems. It is not obvi-
ous, for example, how our memories can be constituted by 
events located in a different spatiotemporal location. While 
it makes room, at least in principle, for that relation to take 
place by recognizing the existence of past events, an account 
of how they relate to our current mental representations is 
still required. The problem is that it is hard to see how such 
an account would look like. Another problem for eternalism 
is that it requires us to pay a high metaphysical price to ac-
count for how remembering grounds our knowledge of the 
past. Because we are required to postulate the existence of 
past events, some might view this solution with skepticism 
(e.g., Michaelian, 2016b, p. 63). 
Another alternative, which I shall call the pragmatist 
solution, is to deny that the pragmatic epistemic question is 
different from the strict epistemic question. On such view, 
having knowledge about the past is simply a matter of making 
useful inferences about how things were back then. Whether 
or not we have knowledge of the past, the pragmatist will say, 
depends on how our memories can inform our future behav-
ior. If memories allow for behaviors that lead to coordinated 
a ion with other individuals in relevant settings, such as dis-
cussing who attended your birthday party, or more primitive-
ly, discussing where food can be found, then that is all that 
is required to say that we have knowledge of the past. The 
pragmatist will deny, therefore, that there needs to be, neces-
sarily, a causal connection to past representations, as long as 
the current representations allow for useful inferences about 
the past. 
The pragmatist solution also faces important problems. 
The first problem is similar to the one raised above to reliabi-
lism. In other words, it will only look appealing for those who 
are already inclined to a pragmatist view in epistemology. 
The second problem is that the pragmatist solution seems ar-
bitrary, in the sense that it seems to imply that our knowledge 
of the past depends on what certain individuals “agree” to be 
the case. However, it is not clear who the relevant individuals 
are in each situation, or even if there is a principled way to 
identify them. Moreover, the focus on usefulness might lead 
to counterintuitive results, for a memory might be useful to 
guide the current behavior of different individuals without 
being true of the past. In other words, it is completely plausi-
ble that subjects might misremember some or all details of an 
event in a similar way, such that their memory reports agree 
with each other, but nonetheless fail to effectively describe 
what happened. 
To conclude this part, it seems that an account of how 
we form knowledge of the past according to the mental time 
travel view might require some controversial commitments. 
While these commitments might take place in different do-
mains – e.g., in metaphysics, as in the eternalist solution, or in 
epistemology, as in the reliabilist and the pragmatist solutions 
– a convincing answer to this question will inevitably require 
a proper motivation of those commitments. 
The objects of mental time travel 
The mental time travel view of memory also raises im-
portant questions about the objects of mental time travel. 
If memory is only one form of mental time travel, then an 
account of the objects of memory will inevitably depend on 
a more general account of the objects of mental time trav-
el. Traditionally, philosophers have addressed the question 
of the objects of memory in quite some detail. Inspired by 
Hume (2011) and Locke (1975), representational or indirect 
realist views hold that the objects of memory are internal 
representations of events (see, e.g., Russell, 1921; Byrne, 
2010). Relational or direct realist views, in contrast, say that 
the objects of memory are the past events themselves (see, 
e.g., Reid, 2000; Laird, 2014; Russell, 2001; Debus, 2008). 
Given this framework, one natural suggestion here to ad-
dress the question of the objects of mental time travel would 
be to take one’s preferred account of the objects of memo-
ry and apply it to mental time travel. However, this seems 
to get things backwards. On the mental time travel view of 
memory, the mental time travel category is more basic than 
the category of memory, so we first need an account of the 
objects of mental time travel, which will only then inform 
our account of the objects of memory. 
The question of the objects of mental time travel has 
not been addressed in the literature so far. So, there are no 
e ablished views about it. However, this should not prevent 
us from thinking about how an answer to the question might 
look like. One way to start addressing it is to distinguish be-
tween different forms of mental time travel. Although this is 
not always made explicit in discussions on the subject, there 
is more than one way in which mental time travel into the 
past and into the future can happen. Besides episodic mem-
ory, which refers to mental time travel to past events that 
occurred, and episodic future thinking, which refers to men-
tal time travel to events that might occur, we may also think 
about counterfactual events located in subjective time (see 
De Brigard, 2014). For example, I can think about how my 
life would be right now if I had not gone to college. In this 
case, I am thinking about an event that could have happened 
in the past and that would influence the present, but that is no 
longer possible. Similarly, I can think about how my life would 
be in ten years if I had not gone to college. In this case, I am 
12 Debus makes the exact same point when she claims that “the Relational Account [of memory] must be true if we accept (as we should) 
that people can sometimes gain knowledge about the past on the basis of their [memories]” (2008, p. 406-407). However, her account 
of memory requires postulating a fundamental separation between memory and other forms of mental time travel view, which makes 
her view unpromising here (see Debus, 2014 and section “The metaphysics of mental time travel”).
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thinking about an event that would be the case in the future 
if some other event in my past had been different. In both 
cases, then, I am entertaining thoughts about counterfactual 
situations oriented to the past and to the future. 
The above suggests that an account of the objects of 
mental time travel needs to take into account not only episod-
ic memory and episodic future thinking, but also forms of ep-
isodic counterfactual thought (see De Brigard, 2014) directed 
to the past and to the future. This makes the initial question 
significantly harder, for now we have to explain how things 
that can no longer be the case can somehow be the objects of 
our thoughts. One promising line of investigation might be to 
appeal to the notion of intentional objects. Intentional objects, 
as originally introduced by Brentano (2014), are non-existent 
objects which are the direct objects of awareness of the mind. 
Although this is a promising line, no one has pursued it sys-
tematically as of yet.13 
Another alternative might be to look at the traditional 
accounts of the objects of memory as starting points. While 
relational views have been defended more consistently in 
the context of memory, they do not seem to offer promis-
ing pro ects for a more general account of the objects of 
mental time travel. The reason is that the objects of mental 
time travel, except arguably for the objects of memory, do 
not exist, which makes it impossible for us to be related to 
them. So, unless one is willing to commit to more contro-
versial metaphysical views, such as the view that there are 
intentional objects (e.g., Crane, 2001, 2013) or some form 
of modal realism (Lewis, 1986), it is not clear whether re-
lational views can be coherently sustained. In contrast, rep-
resentational views might be more promising. Because the 
objects that are represented by mental time travel need not 
exist to be represented, there is no need to worry about 
the metaphysical status of those events. What is relevant 
to explain how we are aware of the relevant events is the 
existence of representations, which would serve as proxies 
for the events. It is not clear, however, what the problems 
for a representational account of the objects of mental time 
travel would be. Since this question has not been explored in 
enough detail, it remains to be seen whether representation-
alism can stand up to a more detailed analysis. 
The metaphysics of mental time travel 
The consideration of the questions above finally puts 
us in a position to consider a more general question about 
the metaphysics of mental time travel. As we saw, the men-
tal time travel view of memory raises a lot of different issues 
regarding the epistemology and the metaphysics of memory. 
But how pressing those questions are will depend on how 
one sees the category of memory in relation to the broader 
category of mental time travel. Until now, I have taken for 
granted that there are good reasons to accept that memory 
is just another occurrence of mental time travel. However, 
some philosophers have resisted this view. Debus (2014), for 
example, argues that memory and future future-oriented 
mental time travel – or what she calls sensory imagination 
– are occurrences of different kinds because there are import-
ant metaphysical dissimilarities between them. 
The debate about the metaphysics of mental time travel 
is still very recent and, as with some of the other questions 
above, there are not well-e ablished views in the literature. 
Despite this fact, I will follow Perrin and Michaelian (2017) 
here and distinguish between continuist and discontinuist 
metaphysical views of mental time travel. Continuists accept 
that the similarities between memory and other forms of 
mental time travel support the more general view that they 
are occurrences of the same kind. Discontinuists, in contrast, 
say that those similarities are not enough to say that memory 
and other forms of mental time travel are occurrences of the 
same kind. 
Reasons for endorsing continuism vary. The general 
motivation, though, seems to stem from different strands 
of research in the empirical sciences. As I discussed in the 
section “Episodic memory and mental time travel”, there is a 
great variety of empirical work that highlights important sim-
ilarities between episodic memory and mental time travel. 
Perhaps the most distinctive motivation comes from the fact 
that mental time travel into the past and mental time trav-
el into the future draw on very similar cognitive resources, 
which suggests that a common or “core” cognitive mechanism 
responsible for mental time travel will be eventually identi-
fied (Addis et al., 2007; Scha er et al., 2007, 2012). In more 
philosophical terms, then, we can see continuism as relying 
on a more naturalistic stance towards the question of the re-
lationship between episodic memory and mental time travel. 
In other words, for continuists views, because there is a lot of 
different empirical evidence suggesting that episodic memory 
is just another occurrence of mental time travel, we should 
take this evidence seriously when thinking about the meta-
physics of mental time travel. 
Discontinuist views, in contrast, seem to be motivated 
by more general a priori considerations about the metaphys-
ics of mental time travel. This is not to say, of course, that 
discontinuists simply ignore the empirical evidence on which 
continuism relies.14 Instead, they believe that other consid-
erations, such as whether mental time travel e ablishes an 
appropriate causal connection to the events in question, are 
also important to provide an appropriate picture of the meta-
physics of mental time travel. Debus (2014), for example, ar-
gues that episodic memory and other forms of mental time 
13 See, however, Crane (2001, 2013) for potentially helpful discussions about intentional objects in philosophy of mind.
14 See, for example, Perrin (2016) for a more modest discontinuist view that takes into account the similarities highlighted by empirical 
research.
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travel are occurrences of two fundamentally distinct kinds.15 
To support this claim, she says that, unlike episodic memory, 
other forms of mental time travel fail to put subjects in an 
experiential relationship with the relevant events. The notion 
of an experiential relationship is a technical one, which refers 
to the causal and spatiotemporal relationship that subjects 
have to the events that their thoughts are about. In episodic 
memory, this relationship obtains because the relevant events 
did occur and we can, at least potentially, draw the causal 
connection between the current memory and the past event. 
In other forms of mental time travel, in contrast, the relation-
ship does not obtain because the relevant events do not exist. 
Besides reflecting different metaphilosophical attitudes 
towards the same question, the dispute between continuism 
and discontinuism reflects different commitments taken in 
relation to the questions discussed in previous sections. Con-
sider the question of whether episodic memory requires an 
appropriate causal connection to past events. While con-
tinuism is compatible with the CTM, it does not give the 
causal connection condition a central place in its metaphysi-
cal theorizing of mental time travel. For continuism, the pres-
ence (or the absence) of a causal connection reflects, at best, 
only a difference of degree between episodic memory and 
other occurrences of mental time travel. For discontinuists, 
however, this question is central to the metaphysics of mental 
time travel. The presence (or the absence) of a causal connec-
tion is sufficient to separate two mental occurrences as being 
of two different kinds. 
The same applies to the question of our knowledge of 
the past and the objects of mental time travel. For continuists, 
like Michaelian (2016b), a proper account of how episodic 
memory provides us with knowledge of the past can be given 
by looking at the reliability of the mechanisms that produce 
memories, which, in turn, do not require causal connections 
to the past. Thus, the things that make us aware of past events 
are arguably the internal representations, which are detach-
able from those events. In this sense, continuists might be 
more inclined to adopt a representational view of the objects 
of mental time travel. For discontinuists, in contrast, episod-
ic memory is capable of providing subjects with knowledge 
in a way that other forms of mental time travel cannot. This 
is because it puts us in a relationship to past events, which 
necessarily involves a causal connection to them that is not 
possible by means of other forms of mental time travel. Thus, 
discontinuists might not be satisfied with a representational 
view of the objects of mental time travel, as representations of 
events can occur in the absence of causal connections to the 
relevant events. A direct realist or relational view of memo-
ry (see Debus, 2008) will, therefore, seem more appealing for 
discontinuists, which Debus (2014) recognizes to be central 
to her discontinuist account. 
Conclusion 
The view that memory is a form of mental time trav-
el offers exciting pro ects for new research in the emerging 
subfield of the philosophy of memory. Traditional views of 
memory, such as the causal theory of memory, and tradition-
al questions about memory, such as how it provides knowl-
edge of the past and what is the nature of its objects, need 
to be reconsidered in the broader framework of mental time 
travel. These questions, however, are inter-related with more 
general and new questions that arise only in the context of 
the research on mental time travel, i.e., what the objects of 
mental time travel are and what is the metaphysical status of 
those mental states. Thus, the intersection of the philosophy 
of memory and research on mental time travel not only pro-
vides new per ectives to think about traditional questions, 
but also new questions that have not been explored before. 
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